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Abstract: 
Today’s competitive health care markets demand innovation and risk taking on the part of organizations. 
However, increased government regulation and stiffer penalties enacted in the wake of recent high -profile 
corporate scandals and the resulting Sarbanes–Oxley legislation, may render boards less willing to undertake 
entrepreneurial ventures. This article extends the typology of corporate entrepreneurship (CE) developed by 
Covin and Miles (1999) by extending the CE types to address governance activities in the health care sector. 
Four case studies are presented that illustrate each of the typology’s forms. In addition, the implications of the 
typology for health care executives and trustees are discussed and areas for future research are recommended. 
 
Article: 
The business world, stock markets, employees, and the U.S. government have been shaken by governance 
failures at corporate entities such as Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, and Worldcom. The health care sector has been no 
exception with HealthSouth exhibiting questionable governance oversight and offering little in the way of 
effective risk management to stockholders prior to its collapse. As a result of these failures, the U.S. Congress 
intervened quickly and with some fanfare by enacting the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002, which mandated 
sweeping reforms in the governance policies of publicly traded companies’ boards. 
 
Although the legislation specifically targeted public firms, recent efforts by several states’ attorneys general 
indicate that a similar level of discontent is growing among those officials charged with overseeing the public 
benefit derived from nonprofit organizations. For example, the New York State attorney general, Elliot Spitzer, 
has demanded that nonprofit boards observe the basic organizational requirements of Sarbanes–Oxley (O’Brien 
& Spitzer, 2004). In Minnesota the attorney general has gone so far as to prompt the dissolution of the 
governing board of a large nonprofit, Allina, once regarded as a model for integrated delivery of health care 
(Reilly, 2003). The net effect of these activities has been to create an environment where health care 
organizations’ directors are playing a significantly larger role in strategic decisions and potentially limiting 
corporate entrepreneurship (CE) to curtail their own legal liability. 
 
The key features of Sarbanes–Oxley are increasingly well known to the public as a result of high profile 
investigations, notably HealthSouth. The most prominent feature of the law is the requirement that the CEO and 
CFO of a publicly traded entity verify the financial statements. In addition, governance ―best practices‖ under 
the law have also resulted in action to restructure the governance processes of not only publicly traded health 
care companies such as HCA and Tenet, but also their nonprofit counterparts. 
 
The law has reinforced awareness of the public accountability of trustees. Investment rating firms are 
increasingly demanding that organizations demonstrate strong board oversight to sustain creditworthiness. 
These requirements for increased control in some key areas are accompanied by demands for increased 
independence from trustee control (Hymowitz, 2005). For example, audit committees must comprise 
independent, outside financial experts. Investment committees must now be incorporated more completely into 
the governance process as they may recommend actions but not make or manage investments as was often true 
previously (Haugh, 2004). Orlikoff (2005) observes that rating agencies are using their power to demand 
improvement in governance. As a result, boards are increasingly called upon to do business in a more public 
manner with greater involvement of other actors. The net effect is to reinforce the conservative obligations of a 
trustee’s role to conserve the assets of the entity and avoid risk demanded in entrepreneurial settings. 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship, which embodies a company’s innovation, venturing, and risk management 
activities, is necessary in today’s competitive health care markets. However, increased governance regulation 
and stiffer penalties for trustees who fail to meet the new standards may reduce the willingness of many board 
members to endorse or allow entrepreneurial activities under their purview. Chiat (2004) has suggested that 
―our current models of leadership – and governance – have elevated managers to leaders. Boards, as a result, 
often end up doing work that might be considered management. They look at budgets, they look at facilities 
plans, they develop market plans to improve their image or attract clientele. Boards have become legitimators, 
auditors, and custodians of tangible assets. But not leaders.‖ This is a severe indictment of the ability of the 
contemporary board to function in support of entrepreneurial activity by the organization. 
 
In order to study how boards manage CE it is necessary to have a framework that describes the phenomena in a 
systematic fashion. Previous research has focused on organizational innovation in conjunction with CE (Covin 
& Miles, 1999; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Lee et al., 2001) or studied board member’s ownership stake as it 
correlates to various levels of CE activity (Zahra, 1996). However, no research we have been able to identify 
specifically looks at the CE actions and policies taken by boards, either in the general management or health 
care literatures. To address this gap in the research, we extend the CE typology developed by Covin and Miles 
(1999) to reflect governance activities specifically. In addition, four case studies are provided that illustrate the 
different types. Lastly, how health care organization executives and trustees can apply the lessons learned from 
study is discussed. 
 
NEW CONTRIBUTION 
Building on existing concepts of CE and governance, this article suggests a new research agenda to increase the 
effectiveness of health care organizations’ oversight. Given the heightened interest in institutional governance 
by both the federal and state governments, it is likely that many board members will resist current or future CE 
activities at their institutions as a form of personal risk management. However, for those boards that can 
intelligently manage the risk associated with CE in the face of heightened external threats, there is an 
opportunity to seize sustainable competitive advantages in the marketplace. Therefore, this paper provides a 
starting point for board education on effectively restructuring their governance in accord with the demands of 
Sarbanes–Oxley. 
 
WHY HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS? 
Nonprofit health care organizations provide an ideal context for studying CE for three reasons. First, in the past 
20 years U.S. health care markets have undergone significant reorganization involving fundamental changes to 
organizational structures and stakeholder relationships that required extensive board involvement (Fottler et al., 
1989). Therefore, nonprofit health care boards are active and engaged in the management of their organizations. 
Second, no board member holds an ownership position in a nonprofit firm, therefore potential agency conflicts 
are effectively controlled for from a CE research perspective. Lastly, health care delivery organizations’ boards 
are under increasing pressure by purchasers, employers, and governments to change their internal processes to 
improve quality and reduce medical errors (Kohn et al., 2000; Begun et al., 2003). 
 
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Corporate entrepreneurship is the term used to describe the innovative and risk-taking approaches that 
enterprises adopt to gain competitive advantage in their marketplaces. CE is deliberate, firm-level behavior 
through which organizations renew, reinvent or redefine themselves, their industries, their markets, or some 
combination of those factors. The CE designation is reserved for instances where the entire organization, not 
just individuals or small groups within the organization, acts in ways that would be characterized as 
entrepreneurial. As such, the CE construct is particularly useful when studying entrepreneurial activities in 
relationship to the governing board, the firm structure being ultimately responsible for approving organizational 
direction and strategy. 
 
Covin and Miles (1999) have developed a typology that classifies the four most commonly observed CE forms 
(see Table 1). The four forms are domain redefinition, strategic renewal, organizational rejuvenation, and sus-
tained regeneration, which are arrayed in descending order from the riskiest and broadest in scope to the least 
risky and narrowest in scope. Each form is associated with a distinct entrepreneurial activity focus and serves a 





Covin and Miles (1999) stress that the CE forms should be viewed as generic archetypes of entrepreneurial 
activity and that in practice firms may exhibit successful hybrid forms. They further point out that the choice of 
CE form is not totally under managerial control, because organizational evolution that flows from an 
entrepreneurial process are inherently complex, difficult to predict, and have emergent qualities (Committee on 
Quality of Health Care in America, 2001). Nevertheless, the typology presents a useful tool in the empirical 
examination of CE and organizational structure. 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Entrepreneurship in health service firms is closely tied to organizational form. The challenge to existing 
organizations is to restructure their organization in such a way that CE-Type innovations can occur and be 
nurtured to fruition in a timely manner (Chandler, 1962; Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman, 1984). This dilemma is 
particularly acute in the airline industry where so-called ―legacy carriers,‖ such as Delta and United, have 
launched subsidiary carriers (Song and Ted, respectively), competitors to the low-cost leader Southwest 
Airlines. To date these efforts have been unsuccessful, but this has not slowed major airlines’ attempts to 
appropriate the Southwest model. What is evident from these failed ventures is that without comprehensive 
organizational modification, efforts to replicate a low-fare model carrier on the Southwest business model are 
unlikely to succeed (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). 
 
Henry Mintzberg (1989) has described the attributes of the organizational structure that he defines as the 
entrepreneurial organization as a simple, informal, and flexible organizational type. Further, the entrepreneurial 
organizations’ strategies often reflect the vision of a charismatic chief executive directing CE initiatives. The 
strategy process of such organizations is an ―often visionary process, broadly deliberate but emergent and 
flexible in details‖(Mintzberg, 1989, p. 117). 
 
Mintzberg argues, however, that the process of bureaucratization typically follows entrepreneurial development 
and has profound operating ramifications for the organization. In the professional variant of the classic 
bureaucracy, that generally describes hospitals, he cites the existence of the dual structural characteristics with 
high degrees of both bureaucracy and decentralization. This unusual combination gives the professional organi-
zation some relief from the strict hierarchy of classic bureaucracies. Governance is achieved through impersonal 
rules and advancement is primarily based on technical proficiency (Weber, 1947). 
 
The advantages of the professional organization form are substantial for the purpose of entrepreneurship. This 
dual organization form conveys the advantages of democracy and autonomy so highly valued by professionals 
on whom health care organizations typically rely for technological and process advances (Culbertson & Lee, 
1996). Yet, it is also challenged by what Mintzberg (1989, p. 118) regards as ―problems of coordination be-
tween pigeonholes, of misuse of professional discretion, of reluctance to innovate.‖ In other words, the very 
latitude that is granted to professionals in organizations may be countered by protection of organizational ―turf’’ 
in the pursuit of control over professional work (Friedson, 1994). 
 
The response of public sector organizations to these problems is often dysfunctional forms (machinelike). The 
public’s representative body within the nonprofit organization is the governing board. Typically the board has 
been called upon to exercise its fiduciary role to uphold the policies and procedures of the organization as 
developed by management rather than professionals within the firm. The net result may be to drive potentially 
innovative actors from the organization to seek more hospitable opportunities available in other settings. A 
prime example is the rise of specialty hospitals and surgery centers, which are physician controlled and exist in-
dependently of the general hospital (Devers et al., 2003). 
 
THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF THE BOARD 
Boards of directors are being held to higher standards of accountability in the performance of their duties. These 
duties respond to the expectations of the organization’s stakeholders. In the for-profit world, the most involved 
stakeholders are typically the shareholders of the company, with the board elected by those persons as their 
overseers of corporate affairs. The prime duty of the for-profit health care boards is owed to the shareholders 
and is measured as a monetary return-on-investment according to Milton Friedman (Coelho et al., 2003). In the 
nonprofit health care organizations, the stakeholders being represented include patients, physicians both inside 
and outside the organization, staff, suppliers, and the broader community in general. 
 
In the nonprofit environment, directors’ accountability is more varied and complex, and the priorities are more 
ambiguous as to what constitutes the stakeholders’ desired ends and preferred means of achieving them. The 
classic ―duty of care‖ principle requires that an individual director satisfy the test of performing their duties as a 
―prudent person‖ would. In the current climate of calls for enhanced director accountability in all sectors of the 
economy, it has never been more difficult to meet the prudent person test. Reputational damage has always been 
a consideration for directors, but now personal liability issues are of greater concern in the aftermath of several 
years of highly visible corporate scandals and new legislation (Miller, 2001). 
 
Directors’ new work related legal exposure has made board activities more complex as it potentially 
subordinates the organizations’ needs to those of the director. Until recently, a director’s measure of loyalty 
centered their ability to avoid conflicts of interest. In its simplest form, the director is admonished to refrain 
from self-dealing and is prohibited from using her/his position, or the knowledge gained in carrying out the 
duties of that position, for personal gain. This role demands strict disinterestedness on the director’s part, or the 
integrity of the governance process is open to question (Darr, 2005). 
 
For directors of nonprofit organizations, concern for protection of tax-exempt status sets the bar for directors’ 
conduct even higher. Maintenance of tax-exempt status requires no private inurement of directors, or the op-
portunity to benefit financially from the business dealings of the organization. The notion of trusteeship is 
commonly invoked to describe the obligation of board members to their institutions. However as Darr (2005) 
has observed, these individuals are generally not true trustees holding title to property and managing it for the 
beneficiaries of the trust. Nevertheless, the idea of protecting the institution and its corpus is powerful, and 
directors of nonprofit organizations are expected to preserve the institution’s ability to carry out the public 
service mission which justifies its tax exemption as a charitable enterprise. 
 
THE DEMAND FOR DIVERSIFICATION 
Innovation in organizational settings has challenged organizations in the last decade to modify or even abandon 
traditional structural forms in the interest of successful adaptation to a competitive environment. This challenge 
has often caused discomfort for directors as their organizations have moved into uncharted territory, such as 
integrated delivery systems (Short-ell, 1989). If the director narrowly views her/his role as one of protection and 
conservation of the organization’s assets, then aversion to risk taking naturally follows. 
 
The less flattering view of organizational innovation in the nonprofit world is one that sees this activity as 
―commercialization‖ rather than a necessary competitive strategy (Bok, 2003). Commercialization is a partic-
ularly problematic charge when applied to a nonprofit, which is presumably in existence to pursue financial 
success only to support its service driven mission (Drucker, 1990). In the instance of higher education, Bok 
(2003) suggests that commercialization of the educational enterprise poses significant risks for the reputation of 
the institution. He identifies the generation of revenues by universities through licensing of products and 
royalties derived from the results of discoveries by faculty researchers as a prime example. Certainly research is 
regarded as a core mission of academic institutions, and in many instances of health care organizations as well. 
It is not the research process itself to which Bok objects. The Universities’ growing dependence on such sources 
is the problem. 
 
Proponents of partnerships involving the university in the marketplace defend them as innovative and necessary 
to assure an appropriate return to the university for its investment of financial and human capital in research 
endeavors. As long as these ventures are successful, their supporters outnumber their critics. It is when results 
deteriorate, or public criticism emerges, that governing bodies begin to fear the damage to organizational 
reputations and their duties as trustees require them to avoid such issues. 
 
CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP CASE EXAMPLES 
Case Example #1: Domain Redefinition at Allina Hospital and Clinics 
According to Covin and Miles (1999), domain redefinition is the most risky and least frequently observed of the 
four CE forms. This label is reserved for organizations whose entrepreneurial innovations focus on deliberate 
creation of a new product-market sphere or entry into a previously underserved sphere, taking the firm furthest 
away from its pre-existing products, markets, and strategies. Since the firm is entering new product-market 
arena, one would expect an accompanying revision of both the organization’s mission and its vision for the 
future. Clearly, for organizational changes of this magnitude, the governing board will be highly involved. 
 
Domain redefinition CE may occur as organizations attempt to avoid adverse circumstances in their current 
competitive situation, or they may be more opportunistic in nature, as firms attempt to exploit the potential of an 
unfilled product category. In either case, domain redefinition may lead to first-mover advantages by setting 
industry standards and the rules of competition for the category, thus becoming the benchmark by which later 
entrants are judged. The organization chosen to illustrate the domain redefinition form of CE is the Allina 
Health System of Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
 
A conscientious trustee, scanning her/his current environment during the era of proposed health care reform in 
1994 could not help but be influenced by expert academic and consulting opinion proclaiming the impending 
dominance of the integrated delivery system model (Shortell et al., 1992). The question prudent trustees would 
be forced to ask involves whether their organization should join or seek to create such a system? From the 
vantage point of the director, conventional wisdom clearly supported such innovations; to the point that the 
prudence of a director could be questioned if her/ his organization stubbornly choose to remain unaligned. 
 
That the formation of integrated delivery systems would pose challenges for governance of the new enterprise 
has been assumed all along. Pointer, Alexander, and Zuckerman (1997) identified a series of potential govern-
ance pitfalls in research conducted for the American Hospital Association. New levels of governance would 
emerge, accompanied by a need to identify and define roles and responsibilities appropriate to each 
organizational level. These developments would also require new ways of assessing governance performance, 
which is often a difficult issue for boards to confront. Finally, the question of physician involvement in 
governance must be directly confronted and determined (Pointer et al., 1997). Solving these contentious issues 
might pose an arduous challenge for even the most harmonious boards. 
 
To compound the problem facing governing boards, real-world experience has resulted in questioning the 
desirability of forming integrated delivery systems given the difficulty in capturing promised synergies. By the 
dawn of the new century, the integration innovation model appeared ready to unravel (Luke & Begun, 2001). 
Major operational and policy concerns emerged that threatened the core assumptions of the integrated system 
innovation. Paradoxically, as discussed in the following Allina Health System case illustration, governing 
boards found themselves very much at the center of the controversy. 
 
The Allina Vision 
At its apex, Allina can be characterized as the leading example of an integrated delivery system to emerge in the 
1990s, taking on many of the attributes associated with much more established examples of the genre such as 
Kaiser-Permanente. The boldness of the Allina vision was articulated by CEO Gordon Sprenger (1994, p. 135), 
who stated that ―Moving from the old fee-for-service model is a major paradigm shift. To encourage our board 
to look not at occupancy, but at health outcomes, and to look at premium dollars, not how well their individual 
hospitals are doing is a major difficulty.‖ The difficulty in governance to which he alludes resulted from the 
highly innovative and yet ultimately controversial decision to merge with the Medica health plan of the Twin 
Cities. That merger added 550,000 enrollees to the existing 250,000 Preferred Provider Organization lives 
already managed by Allina (Sprenger, 1994). With this merger Allina had brought all of the elements of the 
integrated delivery system model into place, uniting institutional services, professionals (though owned and 
affiliated medical groups), and an insurance organization in the form of a medical health plan under the control 
of a single board. 
 
This bold stroke by Allina clearly fits the definition of domain redefinition put forth by Covin and Miles (1999). 
The decision to merge with Medica was a historic decision that moved the organization into a new competitive 
position, from which it could compete with established integrated delivery systems such as Health Partners of 
Minnesota. At the same time, it carried substantial risk for the organization and its governing board by moving 
away from Allina’s historic dominance of the Twin Cities fee-for-service market in which it enjoyed a 
comfortable reputation for patient satisfaction and care quality leadership. 
 
The Subsequent Dissolution of the Integrated Board and Strategy 
The impetus to reconfigure the Allina organization and its governance structure in 2001 ostensibly resulted 
from the investigation of Minnesota Attorney General Michael Hatch into allegations of improprieties 
stemming from insufficient corporate governance oversight and control (Sweeney, 2001). It is precisely these 
types of governance challenges in integrated delivery systems, Pointer, Alexander, and Zuckerman (1997) 
identified earlier. 
 
Lurking behind the stated reasons for the intervention was a difference of opinion between the Attorney General 
and the Allina management regarding public benefits of integrated delivery system as it existed. In particular, 
the consolidation of the public delivery entity (Allina) and the for-profit financing organization (Medica) under 
common governance was a point of contention for the Attorney General (Geist, 2001). In the eyes of critics, the 
centralization of these forces generated abnormal pricing and contacting powers that worked against the 
interests of Allina’s providers network, on one hand, and purchasers of its health care services on the other 
(Howatt, 2001a). The strategic benefits gained by Allina as a result of its integration were viewed as anti-
competitive and not in the public interest for the broader community that nonprofit trustees are expected to 
serve (Lotterman, 2001). 
 
The subsequent decision to separate the governance structure of Allina into two separate subsidiaries, Medica 
(the health plan) and Allina (the delivery system), did not address these underlying concerns. Rather, a public 
audit of the systems by Attorney General Hatch reported numerous questionable expenditures for travel, 
executive perquisites, and consulting fees that suggested breach of the fiduciary duties of the disaggregated 
governing boards to facilitate the separation. In effect, the two boards were still acting as one and not in the 
interest of the public (Howatt, 2001). The public statements issued by Allina spokesperson Maureen Schriner 
(2001) sought to minimize the influence of external pressure in effecting the transition to two separate boards, 
noting that, ―A reorganization that we went through a couple years ago already divided them into separate 
business units,‖ and continues that ―Establishing those divisions as two independent organizations is really just 
the next phase‖ (Schriner, 2001). 
 
The alleged voluntary nature of this restructuring, dismantling what we have characterized as domain 
redefinition, is called into question by the statement that members of the reconstituted Allina board (comprising 
11 new members and 10 holdovers) received a ―promise made by Allina, and ratified by a judge, that they 
would not be held personally liable for damages from any lawsuits challenging the way the company was 
managed in the past‖ (Sweeney & Hammers, 2001). The necessity of such an agreement clearly indicates the 
deep concern for the personal security of individuals entering into governance roles, based on the allegations 
that prompted the investigation of Attorney General Hatch. 
 
The Allina experience thus presents a cautionary tale for corporate trustees considering bold CE innovations. As 
in the case of Attorney General Spitzer’s investigations of nonprofits, New York, Attorney General Hatch’s 
investigation was conducted under the authority of the state’s nonprofit statutes. These authorities granted to 
states’ attorney generals under nonprofit statutes are emerging as an accepted justification for extending the 
governance provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley to nonprofits (O’Brien & Spitzer, 2004). 
 
A postscript to the major domain redefinition of Allina is the announcement of Richard Pettingill, the CEO 
appointed in 2002 to head the reconstituted Allina, that all individual hospital boards of its 15 hospitals will be 
dissolved into one 20-member central parent board. The new governance structure is presented as an evolution 
to ―one mission, one strategy, one focus‖ and a step toward a ―more patient-centered health care system‖ 
(Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 2004). 
 
It should be noted, however, that the creation of the central parent board affects only the Allina delivery 
organization. The move by Allina to integrate local boards to one health system board is consistent with current 
practice in multi-hospital systems as a means of achieving uniformity in governance policy and efficiency of 
management (Brown & Lerner, 1997). This move toward centralized governance for the delivery organization 
is still significantly diminished in contrast to the prior Allina single board that oversaw the operations of both 
the delivery system and the Medica Health Plan until its forced dissolution. 
 
 
Case Example #2: Strategic Renewal at The University of Wisconsin 
The strategic renewal form of CE refers to organizations whose entrepreneurial activities change the way the 
organization competes in its marketplace. Here the focus of organizational rejuvenation is on the firm itself, and 
the focus of strategic renewal is on the interface of the organization with its external environment as mediated 
by the corporate strategy. The strategic renewal label has been used to describe a variety of phenomena in the 
strategy literature. However, Covin and Miles (1999) reserve this designation for organizations whose new 
strategies represent significant departures from past approaches leading to meaningful improvement in long-
term competitive advantage. Since the variety of strategies open to organizations is nearly infinite, it is 
impossible to delineate a specific list of strategic changes that would qualify as strategic renewal. Rather, in 
identifying strategic renewal, one looks for deliberate strategic redirection that reenergizes the organization and 
significantly improves competitive position in the market or industry. 
 
Although industry leaders at times must engage in strategic renewal to ensure their positions, it is most often 
observed among organizations attempting to improve their position or take over industry leadership. Strategic 
redirection is difficult for an organization to implement, so one would expect that this form of CE would be 
undertaken less frequently than sustained regeneration or organizational rejuvenation. One would also expect a 
high level of governing board involvement in any major strategic redirection decisions. The organization we 
have chosen to illustrate the strategic renewal form of CE is the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics 
and the divestiture and subsequent reacquisition of Unity Health Plan. 
 
The health plan was formed in 1994 through the sale of the internally owned and managed U-care HMO to Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Wisconsin. Over the past decade the plan has grown to 76,000 members and has been 
managed as a joint venture of Blue Cross/Blue Shield, University Health Care, and the Community Health 
System consortium of rural hospitals and physicians (University of Wisconsin Health System, 2004). 
At the time of the initial 1994 transaction the sale of the fledgling HMO was regarded as counterintuitive in the 
light of prevailing strategies to unify delivery systems and financing vehicles. The sale preceded a 1995 
significant governance transformation at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which a new public benefit 
corporation undertook operation of the University Hospitals and Clinics and their subsidiary organizations from 
direct state governance as an agency of the State of Wisconsin. Given the complexity of the ownership and 
governance structures involving public and private entities, it is surprising in retrospect that the 1994 transaction 
occurred at all. 
 
More surprising is the decision announced in June 2004 and executed on January 1, 2005, to strategically renew 
the organization through the reacquisition of the 76,000 member Unity Health Plan from Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield and its successor organization WellPoint. The transaction is predicated on a provision in the 1994 
transaction allowing the University of Wisconsin to reacquire the Plan after 10 years should the joint venture 
partners decide not to renew. 
 
This option was exercised as a result of strategic direction from the University Health Care Board that reflects 
the unique characteristics of the Madison market. These characteristics include a generous state-provided 
benefit support for public employees, a geographically defined service area with minimal presence of national 
health plans, and the existence of other large organized medical groups in the service area that also own 
managed care plans. 
 
The transition of the ownership of Unity Health Plan is too recent an event to allow the assessment of operating 
results. Interestingly, the perceived advantage of this transaction is to allow the parent company, University 
Health Care, ―to increase its focus on remaining directly involved in decisions that impact the care of patients 
and their families‖ (Barnett, 2004). Without the unique shared governance model of University Health Care as a 
not-for-profit consisting of the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics and also the University of 
Wisconsin Medical Foundation physicians group, it is unlikely that such an integrative strategy would have 
been adopted. Thus, a strategy that again appears to go against the now prevailing pattern of health plan 
divestiture at prominent academic health systems, such as Duke and the University of Florida, is highly 
consistent with the focus on organization–environment interface identified by Covin and Miles (1999). 
 
The Unity reacquisition could not have occurred without the restructuring of governance to create the 
organizationally distinct University Health Care entity and board. The execution of this strategy is made 
possible through the existence of a governance mechanism that allows other than public funds in completing 
this transaction. Viewed in this light, the influence of governance and the choices made possible or denied to 
organizations through governance models in the public and private sectors are evident. Flexibility in governance 
structure and practice is essential to the achievement of innovation. 
 
Case Example #3: Organizational Rejuvenation at Swedish Medical Center 
Organizational rejuvenation is the CE type that focuses on sustaining or improving a hospital’s competitive 
posture by modifying its processes, structures, and/or capabilities. Organizations need not change their funda-
mental strategies to be entrepreneurial in the organizational rejuvenation sense. Rather, a hospital seeks to 
increase its profitability and/or to, improve service quality, via existing business strategies, through improved 
execution (Covin & Miles, 1999). From the board’s perspective, organizational rejuvenation and improved 
strategy execution requires both structures and mechanisms to monitor and act on key outcome measures. To 
achieve the desired degree of operational involvement, many hospitals’ boards have had to reorganize their own 
structures and implement new processes to engage in continuous quality improvement (CQI) – in effect 
rejuvenating themselves. 
 
Structurally, boards have created new subcommittees or revitalized old ones’ membership to increase financial 
reporting fidelity, focus on patient safety, oversee executive compensation, etc. A fax poll conducted by The 
Governance Institute in December 2002 (Bader, 2003) found that more than 80 percent of 103 responding 
hospitals and health systems have formed one or more board committees to focus on quality-related 
responsibilities. With respect to improved information flows, two tools many boards are adopting are 
―dashboards‖ and ―balanced scorecards‖ to provide comparative performance measures of strategically 
important hospital processes. 
 
The Swedish Medical Center (SMC) in Seattle, Washington, provides a good example of how a board 
approaches organizational rejuvenation as it relates to quality improvement and patient safety. In 1998, the 
board reorganized itself into five committees to upgrade its oversight capabilities. One goal of the 
reorganization was to improve the measurement of organizational performance and identify meaningful internal 
and external benchmarks for clinical quality. Achieving this goal took several years, required extensive board 
member education, the development of new reporting tools, and drafting explicit policies to respond to the 
reports. 
 
The first capability the board sought to increase was its own understanding of patient safety, customer service, 
quality measurement issues, and strategic control in hospital settings. At the beginning of each quality com-
mittee meeting, SMC’s Quality Integration and Improvement Department prepares training sessions using either 
in-house or external experts. Because of the clinical and organizational complexity surrounding quality 
improvement, the education process takes, ―a sustained effort over several years coupled with a regular flow of 
meaningful information in order to be effective‖ according to Dr. Judy Morton (SMC’s Vice President of 
Quality Integration and Improvement). 
 
To deliver meaningful information, SMC has developed its own quarterly report for the quality committee and 
from that report a ―dashboard‖ for the entire board. The dashboard is a summary tool for board members, 
showing the past quarter’s performance on a limited set of key metrics. Previously, board members were 
inundated with lengthy reports with varying measures from period-to-period that made it difficult to determine 
whether SMC was actually making progress. The dashboard helped board members look at the total operation 
and understand whether or not it was doing the things the board wanted in a systematic and efficient fashion. 
In addition to measuring the system’s current performance, the dashboard has a stoplight icon to indicate if the 
measure is not within the desired range. For example, should the rate of nosocomial infections rise significantly 
above the previous period’s rate or the allowable ceiling, either a yellow or red light will appear next to the item 
(see Fig. 1 for an example). 
 
 
As a matter of board policy, any metric displaying a red or yellow light is an ―action trigger.‖ As Morton
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describes, ―when there’s a variance from the target, there needs to be some sense of urgency and some activity 
and action plan in place that brings it back into compliance or achieves the new goal.‖ To do this, the board 
identifies a ―process owner‖ and empowers that person to form an ―action team‖ to investigate and address the 
problem. Despite these efforts and process changes, it took several years for them to become integral to the 
board’s culture. 
 
In 2003 at the annual retreat, SMC’s board and its corporate leaders had a breakthrough in their thinking about 
the organizational rejuvenation process and sought to codify each of their roles and more closely integrate 
SMC’s clinical leadership in innovation processes. The board gave itself six key roles that can be summarized 
as: (1) to understand the Seattle community’s expectations of SMC; (2) to establish and monitor key metrics to 
meet those expectations; (3) to ensure that management develops strategic plans congruent with improving 
those indicators; (4) to build the health systems’ culture surrounding continuous improvement; (5) to 
consistently demonstrate the board’s commitment to organizational rejuvenation; and (6) to promote 
collaboration across the organization for improving care and service quality. Collectively, these key roles 
provide a map to continual improvement and rejuvenation based on the organization’s current strategies and 
market position. The organizational rejuvenation can be contrasted with the sustained regeneration which seeks 
to fundamentally change strategies on a continual basis. 
 
Case Example #4: Sustained Regeneration at SSM Health Care 
The final form of CE in the Covin and Miles typology is sustained regeneration; the most commonly recognized 
form of organization-level entrepreneurship. Firms engaging in this type of CE are often learning organizations 
where innovation is the norm, not the exception. They welcome change and frequently battle rivals for market 
share. Such firms are characterized by organizational cultures, structures, and business systems that nurture 
continuous innovation and allow them to regularly introduce new products and services to their current markets 
or to enter unexploited markets with existing products. In addition to new product or market entries, such 
organizations also pay close attention to the life cycles of existing products, discontinuing products, or exiting 
markets that no longer contribute to competitive advantage. 
 
In sustained regeneration CE, entrepreneurial innovation is constant and the systems and structures that support 
it permeate the entire organization. Because of this, one would expect that control for this form of CE would fall 
under the normal activities of the management team. While one would expect the governing board to be kept 
apprised of the sustained regeneration activities by management, one would not expect the board to be heavily 
involved in their planning or control. The organization selected to illustrate sustained regeneration is SSM 
Health Care (SSMHC) of St. Louis, Missouri, sponsored by the Franciscan Sisters of Mary, one of the largest 
Catholic systems in the U.S. The SSMHC system has more than 20 acute and post-acute care facilities, a one-
third interest in the Premier Medical Insurance Group HMO, as well as numerous physician practices, ambula-
tory care centers, and other health-related businesses, spread across four states (Missouri, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
and Oklahoma). 
 
SSMHC began its transformation into a learning organization when it joined the widespread movement to CQI 
in the early 1990s, according to Sister Mary Jean Ryan, CEO of SSMHC since 1986 (Ryan, 2004). Unlike other 
organizations that soon dropped CQI and moved onto the next management fad, SSMHC leadership recognized 
that CQI required a profound cultural shift and that true results would not be forthcoming in the short-term 
(Ryan, 2004). After reaching an improvement plateau, SSMHC decided to reinvigorate its quality efforts by 
adopting the rigorous Malcolm Baldrige Award criteria although at that time health care organizations were not 
eligible for the award (Sandrick, 2003). When the Baldrige rules changed in 1999, SSMHC became the first 
health care organization to receive a Baldrige site visit, and in 2002 became the first health care organization 
award winner (Francis & Kosko, 2002). 
 
Through the ―framework, focus, and discipline‖ of the Baldrige process, SSMHC has transformed its culture. 
―We have established system-wide culture of sharing and replicating,‖ says Sr. Ryan (2004) that provides ―a 
climate in which leaders at all levels can emerge and thrive ... a climate in which people are not afraid to take 
risks, even if those risks end in failure.‖ Hand-in-hand with SSMHC’s success in improving patient care has 
come increased market success. SSMHC St. Louis facilities have increased market share at the expense of rival 
organizations (Recognized Best Practices, n.d.) and net patient revenues for the system as a whole have steadily 
increased as has its fund balance (Unaudited Financials, September 30, 2004; LPMG LLC, 2004). 
 
In 1999, SSMHC underwent an organizational and governance streamlining, bringing the entire system under a 
single parent corporation controlling four regional corporations and paring the system’s legal entities from 90 to 
60 (SSMHC Family Tree, n.d.). The new corporate board has responsibility for setting overall system direction 
and policy, while regional boards are left to determine how their local facilities can best serve the needs of their 
communities within the framework of those system-wide policies. The corporate board’s goals are developed 
through its year-long Strategic, Financial, and Human Resources Planning Process (Recognized Best Practices, 
n.d.). System-wide goals are communicated to the regions, facilities, and departments using standardized forms 
and definitions to ensure alignment with the systems’ overall direction. Strategic goals are translated to the 
employee level using individual ―Passports,‖ a performance management tool consisting of a card containing 
SSMHC mission and values along with entity, departmental and personal goals, signed by the employee and 
his/her manager (Passports, n.d.). 
 
SSMHC’s dissatisfaction with the status quo, its relentless quest to improve quality, and its culture and 
governance structure that foster organizational learning all support continuous innovation in ways of serving 
SSMHC patients that are the hallmarks of sustained regeneration CE. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGERS AND BOARD MEMBERS 
This study highlights the tensions facing corporate boards of health care organizations caught between pressures 
to pursue advantage-enhancing CE activities to survive in a competitive marketplace, on one hand, and the 
countervailing conservative forces surrounding corporate governance innovations post Sarbanes–Oxley. A 
nonprofit health care organization’s leadership should recognize that boards, by their nature and in light of the 
current political environment, are inherently conservative and will act to minimize or guardedly manage risk, 
while CE activities require that firms embrace innovation and intelligently manage risk to gain competitive ad-
vantage. Indeed, among their counterparts in the for-profit sector, firms often depend on their boards for 
leadership and direction of CE activities. 
 
This is a role that is often foreign to trustees of not-for-profit organizations who view their role as first and 
foremost one of asset preservation in the face of increased legal and public scrutiny of trustee performance. Or-
likoff (2005) has written that ―The risk is that boards will become so consumed by compliance with regulations, 
standards, legislation, and mandates that they will be unable, or forget, to govern. This, plus fear of directors’ 
and officers’ liability, may motivate boards to become cautious, detail-oriented plodders that lack the vision and 
willingness to take the risks necessary to provide the real leadership that is so much needed in these challenging 
times.‖ It is exactly this caution that is antithetical to the spirit of entrepreneurship in organizations and the 
exercise of bold initiatives cited in the case studies presented in our article. 
 
Nonprofit health care organizations must develop educational approaches to prepare their boards to be 
intelligent analyzers of risk rather than anchors holding fast to the strategies and structures of the past, 
regardless of their suitability for current marketplace conditions. In considering proposed innovations, 
organizational leaders can use the CE typology to evaluate the nature and extent of proposed board 
involvement. The CE activity’s position in the typology can also provide valuable insights as to whether the 
current board structure will allow for meaningful strategic control of that innovation, or whether new board 
policies or structures will be necessary. As outlined in Table 1, the level of board involvement declines. Finally, 
our analysis highlights the additional risks to willingness to engage in entrepreneurial initiatives posed by 
application of Sarbanes–Oxley fiduciary responsibilities on nonprofit health care boards. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS 
Although CE has been the focus of much research over the past decade, to our knowledge this work is the first 
to relate the CE typology developed by Covin and Miles (1999) to policy and restructuring decisions made by 
governing bodies in the context of health care. Future research is indicated along several lines. The first would 
focus on the advancement or expansion of the theoretical model itself, as it applies to health care firms. Work in 
this theme would address the questions: Which specific adaptive health care management strategies characterize 
each of the four forms of the CE typology? Is there sufficient mutual exclusivity among the adaptive strategies 
that characterize domain redefinition, strategic renewal, organizational rejuvenation, and sustained regeneration 
that the expanded model might prove useful in understanding the behavior of health care corporate boards in 
relationship to CE activities? How should the model’s parameters, such as frequency of CE acts, magnitude of 
negative impacts if unsuccessful, and structural change be defined or operationalized? A second theme would 
focus on the application of the model in empirical investigations. Retrospective or longitudinal studies should 
be used to validate the model as a useful approach to measuring the effectiveness of health care organization 
governing board policy and structuring decisions in light of CE activities. 
For example, financial outcomes for organizations whose CE activities are classified as domain redefinition, 
strategic renewal, organizational rejuvenation, or sustained regeneration could be compared. 
 
A third area of research could focus on the application of readily available research tools to the relationship of 
governance and entrepreneurship. For example, through examination of the AHA’s annual survey of hospitals 
one might track the creation or deletion of new services and the correlation of such moves to changes in 
governance. One might also track changes in organizational and board processes as new requirements such as 
independent audit committees are increasingly implemented. Does this lead to hospitals foregoing opportunities 
to avoid external disapproval? 
 
Finally, the question of whether Sarbanes–Oxley may inhibit health care boards from pursuing CE innovations 
clearly warrants careful study from both the practice and policy perspectives. The implementation of Sarbanes– 
Oxley reforms is still in an early stage, and the consequences of these initiatives in the governance process will 
become more evident as their adoption spreads. 
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